ABSTRACT
Introduction
The widespread usage -by health insurance companies, and governments -of copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles as mechanisms to control health-care spending reflects the belief that the demand for health-care reacts to price. The literature on the field, however, has not yet produced irrefutable evidence on the magnitude of this reaction.
By decreasing the price-per-service faced by patients, health insurance increases healthcare demand whenever demand is elastic. The potential effect of health insurance on demand for health services -usually denoted by moral hazard -was first identified by Arrow (1963) . 1 The first study to show the impact of insurance on the demand for health services in an experimental setting was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RHIE) (e.g. Manning et al., 1987, and Newhouse, 1993) . The RHIE suffered criticisms on its design reflecting the difficulty of implementing an experiment when health may be at stake.
The greatest advantage of the RHIE relative to subsequent studies is the randomization of the insurance type across individuals. Randomization establishes the exogeneity of the insurance status and allows the identification of the increase in health services utilization with moral hazard. Since the RHIE, many researchers turned to field data to estimate the effect of health insurance on health-care demand. In non-experimental settings, however, the decision to buy (extra) insurance is not random but depends on the characteristics of the individual. In particular, the higher the individual's risk the higher is the optimal insurance coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) . For example, within a National Health Insurance System individuals who contract private insurance are likely to be those who anticipate, based on private information, a higher than average demand for health care (e.g. Cameron et al., 1988 and Vera, 1999) . Ignoring that adverse selection causes the private health insurance variable to be endogenous leads to an overestimation of its impact on the demand for health services.
The traditional way to deal with the endogeneity of the private (or extra) insurance is to find instrumental variables, which should be correlated with the decision to contract additional insurance but not correlated with the use of health services. 2 
Bago d'Uva and
Santos Silva (2002) argue that the only such variables are those related to an individual's risk aversion. Unfortunately, it is hard to find such variables in most health surveys.
Some authors, e.g. Vera (1999) and Holly (2002) , have used socioeconomic variables as instruments for the insurance decision with limited success. While Holly's work is still unfinished, Vera's coefficient estimates suffer from high standard deviations which hamper any meaningful conclusions about the true impact of the private insurance on the demand for physician services.
The presence of screening by the insurance companies and supply-induced demand by the health-care providers (Holly et al., 1998) are also potential sources of bias. Screening would bias downwards the effect from insurance on utilization while supply-induced demand would bias it upwards. Our data does not suffer from screening biases but may be subject to supply-induced demand. We think the latter is of no consequence in our context because the insurer's payments to providers are relatively low. Nonetheless, finding that extra coverage from private (or extra) insurance within a public national health system increases the demand for health-care is consistent with both moral hazard and supply-induced demand.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the impact of additional insurance coverage on the demand for health-care within a National Health System using the data from the Portuguese Health Survey (1998/1999). 3 The main contributions of this paper to the literature lie in the different approach we take to measure the impact of insurance. First, we use a dataset in which approximately ten percent of individuals are covered by an insurance plan that is unrelated to their current health status. The exogeneity of this coverage removes the need to use instrumental-variable estimation. More specifically, we focus on the most common health insurance plan in the country (ADSE), which is given to all civil servants and their dependants. 4 ADSE beneficiaries have double coverage since 2 An exception, within studies using field data, is Chiappori et al. (1998) who use longitudinal data from a natural experiment in France.
3 "Inquérito Nacional de Saúde 98/99". Data has been collected from October 1998 to September 1999. 4 Civil servants in Portugal are employed for life. This is the main advantage of becoming a civil servant. Moreover, at least at the lower end of qualification the Government pays higher salaries than the private sector. Second, we use a matching estimator technique (Abadie and Imbens, 2004 ), which does not impose any functional form on the impact of health insurance on the demand for health services and allows for heterogenous impacts. The treated group is composed by individuals with ADSE coverage and the control group is composed by individuals covered by the National Health Service (NHS) alone. 5 Third, we estimate the impact of additional insurance on several health services. Traditionally, the literature has focused on "number of visits to the doctor". We believe there is measurement error in this variable: a visit is not an homogenous service, and may vary in quality and duration. More importantly, the measurement error may be correlated with insurance status. For example, those with additional (or private) insurance may have access to better quality and longer visits. In our case, it is also possible that "number of visits to the doctor" is subject to inducement since ADSE pays doctors per visit. Alternatively, we also estimate the impact of additional health insurance on the "number of blood and urine tests" as well as on "at least one visit to the dentist in 12 months." Relative to number of visits to the doctor, the former is a more objective and homogenous measure, in particular its quality is independent of the insurance status. It is possible, however, that ADSE doctors use the number of diagnostic tests to justify more visits so that similarly to number of visits, number of tests would be subject to demandinducement. On the contrary, it is less likely that "at least one visit to the dentist in 12 months" be affected by inducement since ADSE pays dentists by type of procedure and not by visit.
Fourth, since some individuals in our treated group may have been subject to treatment for a long period of time, we split the sample into different age groups in order to control for bias that may arise if the effects from better treatment accumulate over time.
If, for example, ADSE beneficiaries have better (unobserved) health because they have had access to better treatment during long periods of time, we expect health differences between the treated and the untreated group to increase with age. While, the young individuals with access to the additional insurance may not have had the time to accumulate 5 A drawback of the matching technique is the lack of estimates for the effects of exogenous variables beyond the treatment. 4 health benefits, it is plausible that among the older generation the treated are healthier than their NHS-only counterparts. By reporting the results for different age groups we are also trying to separate the "immediate effect" of treatment from its cumulative effect.
The presence of a dynamic effect and the effort to distinguish between short and longterm effects of treatments is, as far as we know, innovative in this literature. We think this estimation strategy may even be of some relevance in experimental settings where individuals are subject to treatment for different durations.
The more conservative average treatment effects (ATT) estimates for the overall sample are: 0.096 for number of visits, which corresponds to 6 percent of the average number of visits, but is not statistically significantly different from zero; and a value of 0.057 for number of tests, which corresponds to 15.8 percent of the average number of tests, and is statistically significantly different from zero. Results show that the ATT for number of tests is more precisely estimated than the ATT for number of visits. The ATTs for both number of visits and number of tests for the youngest group are large representing 21.8
and 30 percent of the youngest group average number of visits and tests, respectively. However, only the latter is almost statistically significantly different from zero. The effects for other age groups are smaller and not statistically significantly different from zero, which may constitute evidence that ADSE beneficiaries accumulate health benefits over time. For at least one visit to the dentist the ATT is smaller and not statistically significantly different from zero. We interpret the latter result in light of Chiappori et al.
(1998) who argued that for services where the non-monetary costs were high the demand would be more inelastic.
Finally, we provide some evidence of the exogeneity of the treatment by taking a sample of individuals, the unemployed, who have double coverage through a family member and compare them with the unemployed from the control group. The effect of treatment on the unemployed's demand for health services should only reflect moral hazard (and/or supply induced demand) and not adverse selection because it is unlikely that they decided the job status of their family members.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the recent literature on the subject and briefly describes the Portuguese health system; Section 3 describes the dataset; Section 4 makes a exploratory analyses of the data; Section 5 describes the matching estimator methodology; Section 6 describes the main results; Section 7 discusses the quality of the matching and the plausibility of exogeneity of the ADSE status; Finally, Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains tables with results.
Background

Short Review of the Literature
As pointed out in the Introduction, in most settings, ignoring adverse selection in the private or additional insurance decision will lead to an overestimation of the moral hazard effect in the demand for health care services. with a negbin specification but switch to a linear specification when they instrument for the insurance variable. The typical instruments used are socioeconomic variables that tend to be more associated with the insurance decision than with health care utilization.
It is hard, however, to justify that any of these variables is an appropriate instrument.
While Vera (1999) justifies the use of these variables as instrumental variables by deriving a structural model of demand for health care and insurance, Bago d'Uva and Santos Silva (2002) argue that the appropriate instruments should be (unobserved) variables related to risk aversion which are absent from most datasets. We agree that appropriate instrumental variables are hard to find. Chiappori et al. (1998) avoid the use of instrumental variables by relying on a natural experiment in France. Yet, natural experiments are a rare phenomenon. Our paper also avoids the use of instrumental variables and instead argues that the civil servant insurance scheme in Portugal (ADSE) is exogenous to the beneficiaries' health. 6 We were recently aware of simultaneous work by Trujillo et al. (2005) where the authors rely on a propensity score matching approach, similar to our matching estimator, to evaluate the impact of a social 6 The two other potential sources of endogeneity of insurance status have been almost ignored by the received literature, perhaps because their perceived effects are small. The first one is screening from private insurance companies. Screening consists in denying insurance coverage to the highest risks. The second source is supply-induced demand.
A doctor/hospital may induce more demand from those patients holding more generous insurance since these patients pay a smaller fraction of the fees. The inducement of demand is likely to be stronger when insurance companies pay fee-for-service to doctors or hospitals. If insurance choice is only affected by screening from insurance companies then ignoring this effect may lead to an underestimation of the moral hazard effect (Coulson et al, 1995) . The literature has not paid attention to this potential bias. Finally, when supply-induced demand is correlated with insurance status the estimated effect of moral hazard will be, most likely, biased upwards.
7 Van pages [21] [22] [23] [24] . The largest subsystem and the focus of our paper, ADSE, covers 15% of the population including all employees of the NHS. This is a compulsory scheme for civil servants for which they pay 1% of their salary. ADSE beneficiaries have access to three types of assistance: First, ADSE has agreements with providers where the beneficiaries enjoy reduced copayments; Second, the beneficiaries may decide to choose a provider outside the ADSE agreement network in which case they pay a higher copayment. Finally, ADSE beneficiaries may also benefit from all services offered by the NHS network subject to the same small copayments and exemptions as any user of the NHS. According to Bentes et al. (2004) , generally the subsystems offer larger benefits than the NHS. The NHS is predominantly funded through general taxation. The health subsystems are funded through employer and employee contributions although for example the ADSE needs to be topped up with money from the Government budget.
After 1992, hospitals and health centers started applying small copayments to NHS users. There is, however, a substantial fraction of the NHS users who are exempt. 8 Copayments and spending in private doctor visits are deductible from income tax, which means a de facto subsidy by the state. Copayments in the NHS are homogenous across specialties and only vary with the nature of the visit -emergency visits are more expensiveand with the type of health care center -visits at central and larger hospitals are more expensive. Copayments in the NHS range between 2 Euros for GP visits at the local health care center and 5 Euros for emergency visits to general hospitals. Diagnostic tests are also subject to copayments. 9 Although the NHS is expected to offer all services demanded, in practice there is very limited provision of certain services such as dental care for adults. Adults demanding dental care usually consult a private dentist. Bentes et al. (2004) refer that according to 1995/1996 Health Survey 92% of all dentist visits are private. For the ADSE beneficiaries, the coverage for private dentists with no ADSE agreement is 80% up to a limit amount and the copayment for dentists with ADSE agreements depends on the specific treatment but vary between 0.95 Euros to 9.18 Euros with no limit. Legally, NHS-only beneficiaries may get partial reimbursements for their dentist visits and treatments but these are so low that few people take the trouble of filling the paperwork. In short, for dental care ADSE beneficiaries face a much better coverage than their NHS-only counterparts who are, in practice, left without coverage.
The private sector has been growing steadily and in 1998/99 accounted for about 32% of the specialists visits while the wide majority of the GP visits were carried out in the public sector (Bentes et al., 2004) . While the percentage of private hospitals beds is only about 23% of total stock, the presence of the private sector in dental services, blood tests, X-rays, dialysis, and physiotherapy is considerably higher (Bentes et al., 2004 ). 8 NHS users exempt from copayments are: the low income, the unemployed, the chronically-ill, pregnant women, children up to 12 years old, drug abusers under treatment, and the mentally-ill. 
The dataset
The dataset covers 48606 individuals belonging to 18186 families and 17491 households.
The sample is selected following the multi-stage design of the census: geographical areas are drawn randomly and in several stages with probability proportional to their population. Within each of the smallest geographical area level, containing around 300 households, random draws select those households to be interviewed.
The dataset has information on socio-demographic characteristics, income levels, doctor and hospital visits, medical procedures, expenditures on physician services, objective and subjective measures of health status (e.g. obesity, and "feels in very good health"), and consumption habits that may affect health (e.g. tobacco and alcohol consumption).
Finally, there is also information about health insurance status of each individual. Most individuals are only beneficiaries of the public National Health System (84%), followed by civil servants and their dependants who are beneficiaries of ADSE (9.99%), third those with private insurance (1.7%) and lastly there are up to 5 different insurance schemes linked to the military and the police. 10 We use three different variables to capture the demand for health services: 1) the number of physician visits in the previous 3 months; 2) the number of blood and urine tests in the previous 3 months; 3) whether the individual has visited the dentist in the last year. Importantly, a serious drawback of this dataset is not to know how many of the visits or tests were done in the private sector and how many were done in the NHS.
Our working sample was obtained after dropping a few observations from the data. insurance (1.7%). We decided to delete all these insurance types from the control group for two reasons: first, because the insurance coverage and copayments may differ from the rest of the control group, which may affect the beneficiaries behavior. Second, there may be non-observable variables correlated with the insurance type that may also affect individuals' behavior.
Finally, we restrict the sample to observations where the individual answers for himself.
This excludes minors from the sample. We also delete observations with missing values on the exogenous variables used. In the case we wish to include a variable with too many missing values such as the daily wine consumption (in litres) we create a dummy variable (winens) that equals one whenever the variable wine is missing, and zero otherwise.
Altogether, our working samples range from 21151 to 21908 observations.
Preliminary and Exploratory analysis of the data
In this Section we perform a very preliminary analysis of the data. Table 1 shows some statistics relative to the first measure of health care services, number of visits to a doctor in the previous 3 months. The second column of Table 1 shows that, regardless of their insurance status, 53 percent of the people had at least one visit to the doctor in the previous 3 months. The p-value of the t-test indicates that the unconditional probability of at least one visit does not significantly differ across insurance types. However, as the first column of Table 1 also shows the average number of visits to the doctor is significantly smaller for the beneficiaries of ADSE than for those with the NHS-only. The higher number of visits for the beneficiaries of the NHS-only may reflect the requirement to visit a GP before visiting a specialist, this is not a requirement for the ADSE beneficiaries.
This requirement is one of the main reasons why we consider visits to the doctor to be a less than perfect variable to study the prevalence of moral hazard in this context.
In order to circumvent the potential measurement error in number of visits, we also analyze blood and urine tests. Statistics for number of tests are shown in Table 2 . The unconditional mean of number of tests for the ADSE group is significantly higher than the mean number of tests for the NHS-only group.
Another measure of interest is dental services. ADSE has a generous coverage for dental services while the NHS-only beneficiaries, in practice, visit private dentists and pay the full fee. As expected, the unconditional probability of having at least one visit to the dentist in the previous 12 months is significantly higher for the ADSE group than for the NHS-only group as Table 3 shows.
The differences between the two types of insurance are wider if one looks at certain pre-determined variables (see Table 4 ). The NHS-only group is relatively poorer and older than the ADSE group. In the ADSE group there are less married or widows than in the NHS-only group and more single and divorced people. The regional distribution of the two groups is also unequal in the full sample. Most civil servants are concentrated in the capital and less in the other areas of the country with the exception of Alentejo, which is the least dense populated region in the country. 11 The ADSE group is more educated than the NHS-only group. The difference is even greater when the comparison involves the no-student population of the two groups since the ADSE group contains a larger proportion of students. The ADSE group also contains less people who are out of the labor force, on sick leave for more than 3 months, not working for some other reason, or unemployed. The percentage of people answering the questionnaire about him/her self is statistically the same in both insurance groups.
In the ADSE group people feel healthier than in the NHS-only group as one can observe by the statistics on subjective health on Table 5 . This makes sense since the presence of 11 The five regions correspond to the five regional health administrations.
13 physical limitations and chronic diseases is more prevalent amongst the NHS-only group with the exception of allergies, which are more common amongst the ADSE beneficiaries.
The ADSE group, perhaps because of the younger age, practices more exercise, drinks less wine and beer and have less weight problems than the NHS-only group. The percentage of smokers is, however, statistically the same in both groups. Finally, the ADSE beneficiaries practice a better dental hygiene than the NHS-only group.
Methodology
Our treatment group is composed of ADSE beneficiaries and represents roughly 10 percent of our sample. ADSE is the most common health insurance plan in the country, which is given to all civil servants and their dependants. The matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2004) is used to estimate the "average treatment effect on the treated" (ATT) i.e. the average increase in the demand for health services amongst ADSE beneficiaries due to their double coverage. We argue it is very unlikely that individuals want to become civil servants just in order to benefit from ADSE health insurance since the NHS offers practically universal service. Moreover, if health coverage were the main objective, other health subsystems, such as the one offered to the banking sector employees and their dependants, offer much better coverage than ADSE. If our argument is true then we may rule out the existence of adverse selection in ADSE. It is also implausible for the state to choose individuals on the basis of health variables unobserved to us. The hiring process for civil servants is highly regulated and starts with a public call for applicants who need to fulfill certain criteria. Beyond being physically capable for the job, health status is not included among the criteria, and more importantly, the candidate's expected health status in the future is not taken into consideration (e.g. genetic diseases). 12 In short, we believe there are good arguments to discard selection bias in our ATT estimates.
Our ATT estimates may, however, be a biased estimated of moral hazard. On one hand, we may underestimated moral hazard if ADSE beneficiaries enjoy more or better treatment than NHS-only beneficiaries. For example, suppose civil servants enjoy regular check-ups at their place of work and NHS-only beneficiaries do not. 13 Over the individuals' life, this better treatment would translate into a significant accumulation of health advantages by the ADSE beneficiaries relative to their NHS-only counterparts. In this case, the impact of ADSE should be larger for the young beneficiaries who did not yet had the time to accumulate health advantages, and smaller for the old beneficiaries who would be healthier than their NHS-only matches and, therefore, demand less health services. In order to identify this effect we estimate the ATT for each age group separately.
On the other hand, we may overestimate moral hazard if there is supply-induced demand for ADSE beneficiaries. Supply inducement is more likely to occur in the number of visits to the doctor and in the number of tests since ADSE pays doctors, except dentists, per visit. 14 However, the ADSE payments to doctors are low so we think the magnitude of this effect, if positive, is relatively small.
Finally, the positive impact of ADSE on the demand for health services may not be due to moral hazard but be the consequence of undertreatment in the NHS, for example due to the existence of capacity constraints. We discard this interpretation since the portuguese NHS has (and had already at the time of the survey) agreements with private providers to deliver those services the NHS is incapable of delivering.
Various methods of semiparametric estimation of average treatment effects under exogeneity have recently been proposed in the econometric literature (see Imbens, 2004 , for a review and references). In this paper, we apply matching estimators in order to estimate the impact of having additional health insurance coverage on the demand for health services. Matching estimators have not been applied before in this context and have the advantage of avoiding the imposition of functional form restrictions. 15 In particular, we apply the matching estimators proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2004) , "AI" in what follows, who derive the large sample properties of matching estimators of average treatment 13 Notice that if the availability of regular check-ups was the difference in quality then civil servant dependants, also ADSE beneficiaries, would not be entitled to this benefit.
14 Doctors may request more tests in order to justify more visits. ADSE pays dentists by type of procedure and not per visit. Inducement by dentists would then be reflected in a misreport of the type of services provided to the patient and not in the number of visits to the dentist. 15 Both matching and traditional regression analysis assume that selection into treatment is "on the observables". Contrary to regression analysis, matching does not make the linear functional form assumption. Moreover, if selection is actually on the observables but linearity does not hold, then matching estimates are consistent while regression estimates are not.
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effects and consistent estimators for their variance. 16 We are interested in estimating the average effect of a binary treatment (having ADSE health insurance coverage) on some outcomes (several measures of health care utilization: physician visits, tests and dentist visits within different time periods). Each individual i, Our main focus is on the population average treatment effect on the treated (τ p,t ) and its sample counterpart (τ s,t ):
where
is the number of treated individuals. The main idea behind matching estimators is that, if assignment to treatment is independent of the potential outcomes for individuals with similar values of the covariates, the unobserved potential outcomes can be imputed by using only the outcomes of similar individuals of the opposite treatment group. The following key assumptions about the treatment assignment are made:
Assumption 1: For all x in the support of X, 16 While AI focus on "covariate matching", many recent studies have relied on propensity score matching. No variance estimator has been proposed for the case when the propensity score is estimated rather than known and researchers often use bootstrapping methods. However, Abadie and Imbens (2005) show that the standard bootstrap is generally invalid and AI provide, for the time being, the only analytic variance estimators that are formally justified.
(ii) (overlap) c < P r(W = 1|X = x) < 1 − c, for some c.
The combination of unconfoundedness and overlap is referred to as strong ignorability (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . The overlap assumption restricts the joint distribution of observables and it requires that the conditional probability of receiving treatment, also known as the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) , is bounded away from zero and one. Without overlap in the covariates distributions, all individuals with a given covariate pattern would receive the same treatment and there would be no similar individuals of the opposite treatment group. Our estimated propensity score is actually bounded away from zero and one when considering the whole sample and also when we split the sample by age groups. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the estimated propensity score for all treated and control units used in the matches. Immediately, we see that the last bin for controls is empty, which may constitute a problem. Note, however, that this is no longer the case when the propensity score is estimated separately by age groups, as shown in Figures 2, 3 , and 4 also in the Appendix. These figures suggest that when carrying out our analyses separately by age groups, the degree of overlap is enough to proceed with the estimation.
The unconfoundedness assumption, also known as "selection on observables", validates comparisons of individuals with the same covariates values, i.e. the following is true:
That is, systematic differences in outcomes between treated and control units with the same values for the covariates are attributable to the treatment. Thus, the average treatment effect can be recovered by averaging
We believe that the unconfoundedness assumption is not unreasonable in our context.
In this respect, it is worth remarking that the NHS is available to everyone almost for free and of relatively high quality. Furthermore, as argued in the beginning of the Section, it is unlikely that individuals anticipating a high healthcare demand choose to become civil servants in order to obtain ADSE coverage as well as it is unlikely that the State selects employees on the basis of their current or future health status.
In many studies, the number of exogenous variables is large and an exact match may be impossible. Therefore, matching is based on the observations that are "close" in terms of their covariate values. More precisely, let j m (i) be the index of the individual that is the m-th closest match to individual i in terms of the distance measure based on the norm k·k, among the individuals with the treatment opposite to that of individual i. Formally,
where 1 {·} is the indicator function, equal to one if the expression in brackets is true and zero otherwise. 17 Matching is carried out with replacement, allowing each individual to be used as a match more than once, which produces matches of higher quality than matching without replacement by increasing the set of possible matches.
The simple matching estimator for the average treatment effect for the treated that AI propose uses the following estimate for the imputed potential outcome:
where I M (i) denotes the set of indices for the first M matches for individual i. In words, the missing potential outcomes are estimated by averaging the outcomes of the nearest neighbors of the opposite treatment group. Hence, the simple matching estimator for the average treatment effect for the treated discussed in AI is:
where N 1 denotes the number of treated individuals in the sample.
AI show that due to matching discrepancies this estimator has a bias of order
where K is the number of continuous covariates. To remove this bias, they propose a bias-corrected matching estimator that adjusts the differences within the matches for 17 These definitions can easily be generalized to allow for the presence of ties.
the differences in their covariate values by combining the matching process with a regression adjustment. The adjustment is based on an estimate of the regression function
for W = 0 since we are interested in estimating the average treatment effect for the treated. 18 Given the estimated regression function for the controls, the missing potential outcomes are predicted as:
with corresponding estimator for the ATT:
This bias adjustment makes matching estimators N 1/2 -consistent. 19 Our application suggests that the bias obtained with the simple matching estimator may be large.
Results
In this Section we show estimates for the ATT using different specifications.
20 Table 6 shows results for number of visits to the doctor and number of tests when matching is done on a wide set of covariates. We classify the set of covariates into two groups. Group 1 consists of individual characteristics such as age, female dummy, marital status, number of family members, region dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, years of schooling, employment status, occupational dummies, and up to eleven income level dummies; Group 2 consists of variables that are more related to the individual's health status or habits such as on-sick-leave for more than 3 months, on-sickleave for less than 3 months, other reasons for not working, daily average consumption of wine (in litres), underweight, overweight, obesity, restricted activity, and other diseases such as asthma, diabetes, bronchitis, allergies, high blood pressure, back pain, living habits such as exercise, smoking, intake of sleeping pills, and subjective measures of health. 18 AI use non-parametric estimation to impute the value for the untreated. 19 For details on the properties of the matching estimators and their variance see AI. 20 Results were obtained from running different versions of the Abadie & Imbens Matlab programs provided in their web pages. Table 7 shows the estimated ATT when we restrict the variables used for matching to the variables in group 1, and a few variables in group 2 such as asthma, allergies, and diabetes, which we think are exogenous in this context. 21 The other variables in group 2 are potentially problematic. For example, there are at least two problems with the subjective measures of health although the received literature typically includes them as controls for unobserved conditions. 22 The first segment on Tables 6 and 7 shows the results obtained with the whole sample the coefficient of the ADSE dummy in a OLS regression. 23 The three bottom segments in Tables 6 and 7 show the estimated ATT obtained after splitting the sample into three age groups.
24 21 We excluded diabetes from matching for the eldest cohort because it may be the outcome of bad eating habits and, therefore, related to quality of health services received. On the contrary, it is more likely to be a genetic condition for the youngest cohorts. 22 One of the problems with perceived measures of health identified in the literature is their sensitivity to the order in the survey. It has been shown that if perceived health is asked at the outset, individuals tend to tell the truth. This is the case in the Portuguese Health Survey. 23 Reported standard deviations for the unconditional mean difference and the OLS regression are corrected for clustering. This correction may be important since more than one family member may be present in the sample implying error terms are not independent. Correcting for clustering, however, hardly affected the standard deviations. 24 The variance for the ATT has been calculated using one match and allowing for heteroskedasticity.
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Results show that, especially for number of visits to the doctor, the simple-matching estimator of ATT produces at times very different results from the bias-adjusted matching estimator. As discussed in the previous Section, the simple-matching estimator is biased when there are continuous covariates, as it is the case of the age variable. Hence, we regard the bias-adjusted estimates as more reliable. Table 6 shows that for the overall sample, the simple-matching produces a strong and statistically significantly different from zero ATT for number of visits to the doctor whereas the bias-adjusted matching shows a small and not statistically significantly different from zero effect. For number of tests, the difference between the simple-matching and the bias-adjusted ATT is smaller and both estimates are positive and statistically significantly different from zero. The statistically insignificant impact of ADSE on number of visits and the larger effect on number of tests may have several explanations: First, the heterogeneity of visits, e.g. the requirement to visit the GP before the first visit to a specialist artificially increases the number of visits for the NHS-only group; Second, higher quality services provided to the ADSE group may reduce the number of visits needed to treat the same condition; Third, the ADSE group is unobservably healthier, which would occur if the ADSE group enjoyed better services. In order to isolated the latter bias we present the estimated ATT by age group with the conviction that if it exists, the bias should be larger for the older generation, which has had more time to accumulate health benefits relative to their NHS-only counterparts, and smaller or inexistent for the younger generation. The estimation by age group improved the quality of the matching thereby reducing the disparity between the simple-matching and the bias-adjusted ATT estimates.
The youngest cohort in Table 6 has the largest estimated ATT for number of visits.
The ATT of 0.533 (bias-adjusted and M = 1) represents 48% of the average number of visits for that cohort and is very statistically significantly different from zero. As argued, it is likely that the youngest cohort has not accumulated health benefits so this large effect is solely due to moral hazard. The second largest estimated ATT (0.342) is obtained for
Regarding the metric used to measure the distance between covariates, let k x k V = (x 0 V x) 1/2 be the vector norm with positive definite weight matrix V and define k z − x k to be the distance between the vectors x and z. We follow Abadie and Imbens and define V as the diagonal matrix of the inverse of the covariate variances. the oldest cohort but here, although statistically significantly different from zero, it only represents 18% of the average number of visits for this cohort. The estimated ATT for the middle-age cohort is very small (0.04) and not statistically significant. The smaller effects of ADSE on the middle-age and eldest cohorts may be due to the accumulated health benefits derived from better health care over the years.
The estimated ATT for number of tests in Table 6 is typically smaller than for number of visits but statistically significantly different from zero for all cohorts but the eldest. The estimated ATT is largest for younger groups, possibly also reflecting accumulated health benefits from ADSE coverage. The estimated ATT for the youngest cohort represents 65% of the average number of tests for this age group and 22% of the average for the middle-age groups. These effects are quite substantial.
When comparing results from Table 6 with those in Table 7 notice that, at least for number of visits, the differences between the simple-matching and the bias-adjusted estimates are smallest in the latter. Also, the exclusion of most of the covariates in group 2 leads, in general, to a drop in the ATT estimates and, except for the youngest cohort, to a rise in the standard deviations. The estimated ATT for number of visits in Table   7 are still large for the youngest and oldest cohorts, representing 21.8 and 12.6 percent of the average number of visits respectively, but so imprecisely estimated that none of these estimates are statistically significantly different from zero. In contrast, the ATT for number of tests is statistically significant for the overall sample and almost statistically significantly different from zero for the youngest cohort, representing 15.8 and 30 percent of the average number of tests, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 may contain more than one member per family. In these situations the error terms are not independent, which causes a bias in the standard deviations. In Table 8 we reestimated the ATTs from Table 7 restricting the sample to one member per family in order to obtain correct standard deviations. Most results are similar to the ones in Table 7 except the ATT for number of tests for the youngest cohort, which is now considerably larger and strongly statistically significantly different from zero. 25 25 Due to the high number of zeros and ones in number of visits and number of tests we decided to estimate the ATTs also on the binary versions of these variables i.e. at least one visit and at least one
The samples in the previous
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Finally, we also estimate the ATT for the variable at least one visit to the dentist in the 12 months prior to the interview. Since for dental services ADSE beneficiaries have a much higher coverage than the NHS-only group, we expect a positive impact of ADSE in the probability of visiting a dentist. Table 9 shows the ATT estimates for the whole sample and for the age group subsamples controlling for the smallest set of regressors.
Results show a positive effect for all the samples but the middle-age, but none of the estimates is statistically significantly different from zero. Chiappori et al. (1998) argued that when non-monetary costs are large the demand is more inelastic and this may well be the explanation for the small or inexistence effect of ADSE in dental care. Alternatively, this result may be the consequence of a coarse dependent variable and if instead we had number of visits to the dentist we may have found an effect.
Robustness Checks
In this Section we intend to look deeper at two important issues. First, given the high standard deviations of some of our estimates it is important to check the quality of the matching i.e. whether individuals in the treatment and control group are really alike.
Second, we would like to present some evidence of the exogeneity of ADSE which is our main identifying assumption .
The Quality of Matching
To establish the quality of matched pairs used in our estimation we follow the same strategy as Abadie and Imbens (2004) in their Table 3 . In order to keep the number of tables low we present evidence of the quality of matching only for the variables used in the more conservative estimations presented in Table 7 .
test both in the previous 3 months. The comparison of the estimated ATTs share similar features to the previous tables. For example, when excluding most covariates from group 2, the simple-matching ATT estimates became similar to the bias-adjusted estimates, the estimated ATTs dropped, and the standard deviations increased for all but the yongest cohort. However, the ATT estimates were, in general, imprecisely estimated so none of the bias-adjusted ATTs for number of visits are statistically significantly different from zero. For number of tests, again the ATTs are statistically significant for the overall and the youngest cohort but only statistically significantly different from zero for the middle-age cohort when all covariates are used for matching. Similarly to the results in Tables 6 and 7 , the estimated ATT is larger for the youngest cohort.
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First, all the covariates were normalized to have mean zero and variance equal to one.
The first two columns in Table 11 show the average for the ADSE group and the NHS-only group before matching. The difference between the first and the second column is reported in the third column to facilitate the reading of the table. The fourth and fifth columns represent the average of the covariates for the ADSE and NHS-only groups, respectively, computed with those observations used in the single matching case (M = 1). The sixth and seventh columns represent the average difference within the matched pairs for each covariate and its standard deviation.
The matching is not perfect. However, for most variables the difference in averages between the treatment and the control group is much smaller after the matching than before the matching (compare columns 3 and 6). In fact, only for three of the covariates ("age", "female" and "centro") is the difference between treated and control averages higher after the matching. The large size of the difference in averages after the matching for the age variable indicates that the matching for the overall sample is not of high quality and is consistent with the improvement on the matching quality found when splitting the sample by age group. For a few of the indicator variables the matching is even exact (i.e.
"student", "clerks","skilled agricultural worker", "income C", "income D") while for the remaining covariates the average difference within the matched pairs is close to zero and never statistically different from zero.
On the Exogeneity of the Insurance plan
Our identification strategy relies on several assumptions. First, we believe that those individuals who expect to use more health services do not select themselves to become civil servants in order to benefit from ADSE coverage. As argued above the greatest benefit of becoming a civil servant is to hold a job for life and, for some job categories, the wage offered by the Government is higher than the wage offered by the private sector.
Moreover, other subsystems such as the one associated with the banking sector offer better health insurance coverage than ADSE. Still, there is the possibility that those who expect to use more health services, because they are sicker or because they are more risk averse, would more likely become civil servants. Second, it must be true that the state does not 24 select its employees on the basis of unobservable (to us) health variables. As we argue in the previous Section, the Government must make a public call for applicants and the process is highly regulated and objective. Applicants must fulfill certain criteria and apart from being physically able for the job, health status is not part of the criteria. Third, for the unconfoundness assumption to hold, it must be the case that ADSE beneficiaries are not unobservably healthier, for example because they have enjoyed more years of better treatment. If this holds then those individuals who have been ADSE beneficiaries for a longer period of time would visit the doctor less and demand less tests than their NHSonly matches, which would imply a smaller impact of ADSE on the old than on the young because the latter have not yet had the time to accumulate these health benefits. The results by age group discussed in the previous Section show that the impact of ADSE is larger for the young cohort and, at least for the case with all covariates, strongly statistically positive. This suggests that the unconfoundness assumption may not hold for the middle-age and eldest cohorts or, in other words, that there is a long-term effect from ADSE.
In order to support the first identification assumption, i.e. whether ADSE beneficiaries are more risk averse than their NHS-only counterparts, we ran OLS regressions of risky life-style habits such as smoking and drinking against the restricted set of covariates and an ADSE dummy. We find that ADSE beneficiaries consume statistically significantly more wine but less whisky. All other life-style behaviors were identical in both groups.
These regressions do not offer clear evidence that ADSE beneficiaries are more risk adverse than NHS-only beneficiaries.
To support the first and the second identification assumptions, we focus on a subsample of ADSE beneficiaries that obtain ADSE coverage through a family member rather than in their own name. In principle, people who enjoy ADSE through someone else would only be subject to moral hazard and, therefore, the first and second identification assumptions should hold by default. Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow us to identify whether individuals are covered by ADSE in their own name or through a family member. Hence, we restrict our sample of ADSE beneficiaries to individuals who are unemployed and, therefore, cannot be civil servants. This approach is similar to the one followed by Vera (1999) who splits the sample between heads of households (in principal, those that take the decision of contracting private insurance) and non-head of households (beneficiaries of the private insurance who do not take the decision) in order to test for adverse selection in the contract of private insurance. Table 10 shows the estimated ATT for number of visits to the doctor, number of tests, and at least one visit to the dentist in the previous 12 months for unemployed ADSE beneficiaries when excluding most variables from group 2. The first thing to notice is the imprecision of most ATT estimates which is due, most likely, to the small sample size (878 observations). We restrict our description to the bias-adjusted ATT for one match (M = 1) because the quality of the matches for M = 4 is not good with such a small number of observations. The magnitude of the ATT for number of visits, number of tests, and for at-least-one dentist visit are much higher than the ATTs for the overall sample (in Tables 7 and 9 ), representing 20 %, 114 % and 17% of the average number of visits, tests, and probability of dentist visit respectively, although none of these estimates is precisely estimated. For number of visits and tests we expected a smaller impact of ADSE in this case given that unemployed people do not have to pay co-payments in NHS but are subject to copayments under ADSE.
In conclusion, due to the low number of observations, it is hard to perform a conclusive test on the reasonability of our identifying assumptions. Despite that, the evidence found does not contradict them and the size of the point estimates seem to indicate that the ADSE effect is mostly due to moral hazard.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of additional coverage on the demand of visits to the doctor, diagnostic tests and the probability of at least one visit to the dentist within the Portuguese National Health System. Our paper's contribution to the large literature on moral hazard is fourfold: First, by using a dataset where 10 percent of the sample enjoys an exogenous double health insurance coverage denoted by ADSE; Second, by using a matching estimator technique (Abadie and Imbens, 2004 ), which does not impose any functional form on the impact of health insurance on the demand for health services and allows for heterogenous impacts. Third, by estimating the impact of the additional insurance on several services, particularly on blood and urine diagnostic tests. And fourth, we allow for a dynamic impact of the additional coverage by splitting the sample in different age groups.
In general we find that the impact of ADSE is positive and large. For the whole sample the ADSE effect corresponds to 6 percent of the average number of visits, 15.8 percent of the average number of tests, and 7 percent of the average probability of visiting a dentist at least once in 12 months. The effects of ADSE are particularly large for the youngest cohort 18 − 30 years old where they reach 21.8, 30 and 11.6 percent of the average number of visits, tests and probability of visiting the dentist, respectively for that age group.
Due to the imprecision of estimates we cannot conclude that there is moral hazard in the number of visits since the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) is not statistically different from zero. For number of tests, we do find evidence of moral hazard for the overall sample and the youngest cohort. For the probability of at least one visit to the dentist, where we expected to find the greatest ATT, we do not find evidence of moral hazard. We argue following Chiappori et al. (1998) that the inexistence of moral hazard for dental visits is the consequence of large non-monetary costs for this type of services.
Our data does not allow us to differentiate between the effects of moral hazard and supply-induced demand. The presence of supply-induced demand would lead to an overestimation of the moral hazard effect. Out of the three variables used to proxy demand for health services, we expect at-least-one-visit-to-the-dentist to be less sensitive to supply inducement since ADSE pays dentists per procedure and not per visit, and indeed we obtained the lowest ATT for this variable. However, our results also show a larger ATT for the younger cohort (18−30 years old) when inducement should be larger for the eldest cohort who, especially the retired, has a lower opportunity cost of time and, therefore, a more inelastic demand (e.g. van de Voorde et al., 2001).
The ATT variation by age group is also consistent with long-term positive effects from ADSE. If ADSE's double coverage has a positive impact on the individuals' health, for example because treatment is of better quality or because it allows individuals to exert more prevention, then, older generations, who have been subject to double coverage for longer periods of time, may accumulate health benefits and enjoy better unobserved health than their NHS-only counterparts. The better health of the elder ADSE beneficiaries would reduce their demand for health care relative to their NHS-only counterparts. In this case the estimated ATT for the younger cohort should be larger than the estimated ATT for the older cohorts just as we find in our results.
Appendix A
Here we present an argument for excluding subjective measures from some of our regressions. Denote by y the number of visits to the doctor and H the subjective measure of health or any intermediate output (for simplicity take H to be a continuous variable).
For notation simplicity assume all other characteristics X are constant then the demand for visits could be modelled as:
Suppose for the moment that ε and u are not correlated. We check the bias under correlation below. The partial derivative (obtained when including subjective health measures) is ∂y ∂ADSE = β
but the total effect (total derivative) is in reality:
The total effect is more interesting. Note: All variables have been normalized to have mean zero and variance 1. The first two columns represent the averages of the variables before matching for the treatment and control, respectively. The third column is the difference between the first and the second columns. The forth and fifth columns represent the average of the variables for the matched units only when M=1. The sixth and seventh columns represent the average difference within the matched pairs and its standard deviation, also for M=1. We decided not to show the statistics for month of the interview because it would increase the length of the table considerably. The mean difference for months of the interview (corresponding to column 5) is between -0.1887 for March and 0.1140 for February but none is statistically significant
